![]() Building upon that working description, the Article argues that there are at least three coherent justifications for subnational constitutionalism. It concludes that subnational constitutionalism is best described as a series of rules (both formal and informal) that protect and define the authority of subnational units within a federal system to exercise some degree of independence in structuring and/or limiting the political power reserved to them by the federation. The Article first offers a description of subnational constitutionalism that is derived from rational-choice theories of political institutions and a survey of the world’s federal systems. By modeling plausible consequences associated with subnational constitutionalism, the Article aims to assist contemporary constitution makers considering federal arrangements. The goal is to move towards a systematization and critical analysis of possible justifications for introducing subnational constitutionalism into federal systems. This Article takes up that important but neglected question. Although scholars and constitution-makers have developed various theories regarding the utilities of decentralizing law-making and administrative powers, they have not separately considered the utilities or normative justifications for decentralizing constitutional choices. ![]() Other federal systems allow subnational units some discretion in structuring and limiting their powers by adopting subnational constitutions. ![]() Some federal systems decentralize law-making and administrative power without allowing subnational governments to adopt their own constitutions that structure or limit subnational power. This article considers an overlooked issue of constitutional design.
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